Semantics and Ontology:\ud On the Modal Structure of an Epistemic Theory of Meaning

In this paper I shall confront three basic questions.\ud First, the relevance of epistemic structures, as formalized\ud and dealt with by current epistemic logics, for a\ud general Theory of meaning. Here I acknowledge M. Dummett"s\ud idea that a systematic account of what is meaning of\ud an arbitrary language subsystem must especially take into\ud account the inferential components of meaning itself. That\ud is, an analysis of meaning comprehension processes,\ud given in terms of epistemic logics and semantics for epistemic\ud notions.\ud The second and third questions relate to the ontological\ud and epistemological framework for this approach.\ud Concerning the epistemological aspects of an epistemic\ud theory of meaning, the question is: how epistemic logics\ud can eventually account for the informative character of\ud meaning comprehension processes. "Information� seems\ud to be built in the very formal structure of epistemic processes,\ud and should be exhibited in modal and possibleworld\ud semantics for propositional knowledge and belief.\ud However, it is not yet clear what is e.g. a possible world.\ud That is: how it can be defined semantically, other than by\ud accessibility rules which merely define it by considering its\ud set-theoretic relations with other sets-possible worlds.\ud Therefore, it is not clear which is the epistemological status\ud of propositional information contained in the structural\ud aspects of possible world semantics. The problem here\ud seems to be what kind of meaning one attributes to the\ud modal notion of possibility, thus allowing semantical and\ud synctactical selectors for possibilities. This is a typically\ud Dummett-style problem.\ud The third question is linked with this epistemological\ud problem, since it is its ontological counterpart. It concerns\ud the limits of the logical space and of logical semantics for a\ud of meaning. That is, it is concerned with the kind of\ud structure described by inferential processes, thought, in a\ud fregean perspective, as pre-conditions of estentional\ud treatment of meaning itself. The second and third questions\ud relate to some observations in Wittgenstein"s Tractatus.\ud I shall also try to show how their behaviour limits the\ud explicative power of some semantics for epistemic logics\ud (Konolige"s and Levesque"s for knowledge and belief)

Normativity, Autonomy and Pluralism. Wittgenstein and the Pragmatic Turn in German Philosophy

Habermas and Apel share with the wittgensteinian linguistic turn the main issue which is at stake in the latter. That is: they rely on the linguisticalpragmatic substitution of the traditional Cartesian (and Kantian) subject of representation, thought as the nonempirical and non-objective pre-condition of the possibility of the objective world, with the function of linguistic and communicative interaction as a means of subjective and intersubjective world-disclosure (H. Sluga 1996; Wittgenstein, Tlp, § 5.54- 5.55). The issue basically concerns the way we think about language as a system and a means of representation. What is here at stake is actually the source of its normativity, and the way in which this normativity can be rationally founded

Inferences in context : contextualism, inferentialism and the concept of universal quantification

This Thesis addresses issues that lie at the intersection of two broad philosophical projects: inferentialism and contextualism. It discusses and defends an account of the logical concepts based on the following two ideas: 1) that the logical concepts are constituted by our canonical inferential usages of them; 2) that to grasp, or possess, a logical concept is to undertake an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the concept when deploying it in a linguistic practice. The account focuses on the concept of universal quantification, with respect to which it also defends the view that linguistic context contributes to an interpretation of instances of the concept by determining the scope of our commitments to the canonical consequences of the quantifier. The model that I offer for the concept of universal quantification relies on, and develops, three main ideas: 1) our understanding of the concept’s inferential role is one according to which the concept expresses full inferential generality; 2) what I refer to as the ‘domain model’ (the view that the universal quantifier always ranges over a domain of quantification, and that the specification of such a domain contributes to determine the proposition expressed by sentences in which the quantifier figures) is subject to a series of crucial difficulties, and should be abandoned; 3) we should regard the undertaking of an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the universal quantifier as a stable and objective presupposition of a universally quantified sentence expressing a determinate proposition in context. In the last chapter of the Thesis I sketch a proposal about how contextual quantifier restrictions should be understood, and articulate the main challenges that a commitment-theoretic story about the context-sensitivity of the universal quantifier faces

A study of the logical concepts

The Thesis presents and defends two general ideas. The first is that our logical concepts are constituted by their inferential role. Part I of the Thesis is devoted to the discussion of this idea. The second is that their semantic value is fixed by linguistic context – at least in the case of the concepts’ usages in natural languages. Part II focuses on this second idea. The concept of universal quantification is the main case-study for both ideas. The scope of both the presentation and the defense of these two ideas is different. The inferentialist idea is firstly articulated and upheld as a general view (Chapters I-III), and is then applied to a specific concept – the concept of universal quantification (Chapter IV). The contextualist idea is investigated and defended from the start with respect to the concept of universal quantification (Chapter V). The Appendix then lends some generality to the case made for semantic contextualism, by defending it against a general objection – one that does not specifically concern a contextualist treatment of the universal quantifier, and that has to do with the possibility that tokenings or utterances of a sentence in different contexts share the same content

Inferences in context : contextualism, inferentialism and the concept of universal quantification

This Thesis addresses issues that lie at the intersection of two broad philosophical projects: inferentialism and contextualism. It discusses and defends an account of the logical concepts based on the following two ideas: 1) that the logical concepts are constituted by our canonical inferential usages of them; 2) that to grasp, or possess, a logical concept is to undertake an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the concept when deploying it in a linguistic practice. The account focuses on the concept of universal quantification, with respect to which it also defends the view that linguistic context contributes to an interpretation of instances of the concept by determining the scope of our commitments to the canonical consequences of the quantifier. The model that I offer for the concept of universal quantification relies on, and develops, three main ideas: 1) our understanding of the concept’s inferential role is one according to which the concept expresses full inferential generality; 2) what I refer to as the ‘domain model’ (the view that the universal quantifier always ranges over a domain of quantification, and that the specification of such a domain contributes to determine the proposition expressed by sentences in which the quantifier figures) is subject to a series of crucial difficulties, and should be abandoned; 3) we should regard the undertaking of an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the universal quantifier as a stable and objective presupposition of a universally quantified sentence expressing a determinate proposition in context. In the last chapter of the Thesis I sketch a proposal about how contextual quantifier restrictions should be understood, and articulate the main challenges that a commitment-theoretic story about the context-sensitivity of the universal quantifier faces.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo

The Never-Ending Presence of <i>Phytophthora </i>Species in Italian Nurseries

Plant trade coupled with climate change has led to the increased spread of well-known and new Phytophthora species, a group of fungus-like organisms placed in the Kingdom Chromista. Their presence in plant nurseries is of particular concern because they are responsible for many plant diseases, with high environmental, economic and social impacts. This paper offers a brief overview of the current status of Phytophthora species in European plant nurseries. Focus was placed on Italian sites. Despite the increasing awareness of the risk of Phytophthora spread and the management strategies applied for controlling it, the complexity of the Phytophthora community in the horticulture industry is increasing over time. Since the survey carried out by Jung et al. (2016), new Phytophthora taxa and Phytophthora-host associations were identified. Phytophthorahydropathica, P. crassamura, P. pseudocryptogea and P. meadii were reported for the first time in European plant nurseries, while P. pistaciae, P. mediterranea and P. heterospora were isolated from Italian ornamental nurseries. Knowledge of Phytophthora diversity in plant nurseries and the potential damage caused by them will help to contribute to the development of early detection methods and sustainable management strategies to control Phytophthora spread in the future

Edgar Morin et le cinéma

Edgar Morin aura consacré au cinéma deux décennies de recherche, de 1945 à 1965, une période qui peut sembler de courte durée à l’aune de son importante carrière mais qui peut aussi être considérée comme fondamentale puisqu’elle se situe à l’origine de sa pensée. Ses activités sont alors partagées entre réflexions théoriques, avec la parution de deux livres majeurs : Le cinéma ou l’homme imaginaire (1956) et Les stars (1957), et expériences de réalisation cinématographique, avec Chronique d’un été (1961), un film qui l’associe à Jean Rouch et qui révolutionna le cinéma documentaire. L’ouvrage interroge la singularité de ses propositions en restituant les contextes intellectuels et épistémologiques à partir desquels il a développé son projet d’anthropologie sociologique. Et l’étude de Chronique d’un été permet d’observer à travers les dispositifs les implications du geste filmé dans sa capacité à révéler l’être au monde. Autant de réflexions qui restituent l’importance et la singularité des propositions cinématographiques de Morin, retrouvant de la sorte la dimension politique du voir et du savoir